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Abstract 
This paper analyses possible patterns for the Spain debt-to-GDP ratio with a small macroeconomic 
model. The role of international macroeconomic variables (such as the US and French GDP growth 
rates, prices of raw materials, ECB monetary policy stance) and domestic policy instruments is 
analyzed in the debt dynamics. We find that external conditions, together with policies aimed to 
stimulate the growth and fulfilling Maastricht restrictions on deficit, play a fundamental role for 
fiscal consolidation in Spain and help to reach a sustainable pattern. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of the recession on the Spanish fiscal balances has worsened the debt situation. Its 
budget deficit rose significantly to 9.2 % of GDP and the general government debt reached to 60% 
of its GDP in 2010. For these reasons and the turbulence in the European financial markets, a fiscal 
consolidation plan is necessary to place Spain’s public finances on a sustainable path. Spain must 
now focus on this objective under the Stability Pact of reducing the overall fiscal deficit-to-GDP-
ratio to 3% to anchor the expectations and avoid an unsustainable debt dynamics. 
This paper analyses the dynamics of the Spanish government debt-to-GDP ratio using a small-scale 
econometric model. Our approach follows earlier works of Favero (2002), Favero and Marcellino 
(2005), Hasko (2007), and Casadio et al. (2011). Adopting various scenarios for the exogenous 
variables viz., US and French GDP growth, oil price changes and short-term interest rates, we 
predict that the debt-to-GDP ratio can reach, under international favorable conditions and policy 
interventions on growth and fiscal consolidation, a sustainable path in the next ten years. Section 2 
shows the public debt problem in Europe and Spain. Section 3 presents the basic arithmetic of debt 
accounting. Section 4 presents a brief description of the model and its structure. Empirical results 
are in Section 5. Section 6 shows that under plausible assumptions debt-to-GDP-ratio can achieve 
sustainable patterns. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Sovereign debt problem in Europe and Spain 
The chart below shows the sovereign debt problem in Europe and some non-Euro-Area countries. 
The horizontal axis is the gross public debt-to-GDP-ratio and the vertical axis is the budget deficit-
to-GDP-ratio. Generally, the European Union Stability Pact implies that it is desirable for the debt-
to-GDP ratio to be below 60% and in order to keep this stable the budget deficit should be around 
3% of GDP. Many countries are above these levels as a consequence of the current global economic 
crisis and the lack of a strong fiscal discipline; see Beetsma and Debrun (2005). Spain, compared to 
other Euro countries, does not have a very high debt-to-GDP-ratio, but it is running large budget 
deficits. Therefore, its debt-to-GDP ratio passed from 36% in 2007 to 60% in 2010. This 
unfavorable dynamics, raising doubts about Spain’s ability to undertake the necessary adjustments, 
and the serious sovereign debt crises in the Euro-zone, focused the market’s attention on Spain’s 
3 
 
economy. As a consequence, Spain’s sovereign bond yields are very high at near to 6% in July of 
this year.  
 
Figure 1: The public debt problem (2010 data) 
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Source: EUROSTAT data. 
There are other important reasons why the interest yields on Spain’s government paper are high. 
Spain is a relatively large economy and it accounts for the 12% of the Euro-zone economic activity 
against 6% for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which are the other Euro-countries with higher risk of 
debt default. In addition, Spain accounts for 8% of Euro-zone public debt, compared to just 8% for 
these three high risk countries considered together.1
 
For this reason it is important to examine the 
dynamic of Spanish public debt to analyse policies needed to contain and reduce the sovereign debt 
default risk. 
3. Arithmetic of debt accounting 
The dynamics of debt accumulation can be described with the identities in (1) and (2): 
1 1t t t t tB B i B PB        (1) 
where tB  nominal general government debt at the end of year t, i the nominal interest paid on 
government debt, PB  primary advance which equals tax revenue less government expenditure net 
                                                             
1
 Another country with high risk is Italy. Its economy accounts for 17% of Euro-zone activity and for 23% of public 
debt. 
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of the interests paid on debt (T – G). The same relation holds if the variables are measured in real 
terms assuming that inflation rate is measured with the GDP deflator and we shall use this 
assumption in our estimation. Normally the budget dynamic is written in the form of a change in the 
ratio of public debt-to-GDP (b): 
1t t t t t tb i g b pb        (2) 
where inflation rate, g real GDP growth; variables in lower case denote the same variables 
expressed as ratios to GDP. According to (2), for a given pb, a stronger real GDP growth, a lower 
nominal interest rate, and higher inflation rate will reduce the debt growth dynamics. The following 
condition is needed to guarantee the solvency and debt reduction: 
* * * * *( )pb i g b         (3) 
Where the variables denoted by * indicate the average value over the time span period under 
investigation. 
4. Modelling debt: A small macroeconomic model 
Identity (2) can be used in two different ways: as a single residual equation, incorporating the 
scenarios for primary balance, growth, inflation, and interest rate, determining the debt-to-GDP 
dynamics or as an equation in a more complex model to account for interactions among  the key 
variables.  In this context, recently Favero and Marcellino (2005), Hasko (2007), and Casadio et al. 
(2011) estimated small-scale simultaneous equations models and we follow their approach. Our 
model consists of five equations and the endogenous variables are driven by four international 
variables (US and France GDP growth, Oil price dynamics, and domestic short-term Central Bank 
monetary policy rate).The model is as follows: 
1 2 1 3 4 1 5 6 1 7 8 1
L L FR US y
t t t t t t t t tg g i i pb pb g g  (4)  
(Output equation) 
9 10 1 11 2 12 1 1 13 1 14
L pribal
t t t t t t t tpb pb pb i i b g  (5)  
(Fiscal rule) 
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15 16 1 17 18 1 19 1 20 2 21 2 1
L b
t t t t t t t t tb b g pb b i  (6) 
 (Public debt equation) 
22 23 1 24 1 25 26 1t t t t t tg oil oil  (7)  
(Inflation equation) 
27 28 1 29 2 30 31 32
L L L i
t t t t t t ti i i i b  (8) 
 (Long-term interest rate equation) 
The output equation is explained by international business cycle effects ( 7 0 ) captured by US 
(
USg ) and French ( FRg ) GDP growth rate, and by primary balance (pb). A fiscal consolidation (a 
rise of primary balance due to an increase in government revenues or a cut in government spending) 
has in general a negative impact on economic growth. However, Rohn (2010) considers that the 
direct negative effect on aggregate demand could be potentially counterbalanced by a positive 
indirect effect if fiscal consolidation signals lower future public debt and taxes, as well as 
decreasing precautionary savings. In particular, this effect can be large if public debt is high. For 
Spain the overall effect is slightly positive ( 5 6 0 ) indicating that the indirect effect seems 
to be historically larger. The long-term interest rate has a negative overall effect on growth 
( 3 4 0 ) as expected. 
The primary balance depends positively on output ( 14 0 ), debt-to-GDP-ratio ( 13 0 ) and the 
spread between long-term and short-term interest rate ( 12 ). Higher rates on long-term government 
bonds imply higher costs of public debt services, forcing an increase in government revenues (or a 
cut in government spending) in order to contain public debt growth. We consider the long term 
interest rate as a proxy for the average cost of debt because the Spanish government debt duration is 
getting longer and closer to the duration of long-term bonds. Figure A1 in Appendix confirms our 
view, as the deficit-to-GDP ratio calculated using the long-term bond interest rate as a proxy of the 
average cost of debt follows closely the official debt series.  
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The debt-to-GDP ratio is explained by GDP growth, inflation, primary balance, and debt service 
payments. All signs in the equation are as expected (i.e., 17 0 , 19 20 0 , 18 0 , 
21 0 ) according to our analysis in Section 3. 
Inflation in equation (7) depends positively on oil price growth ( 25 26 0 ) and output growth 
( 24 0 )
2
.  
In the last equation (8) the long-term interest rate depends positively on the short-term interest rate 
( 30 0 ), on inflation ( 31 0 ), and on debt-to-GDP-ratio ( 32 0 ). High government debt, 
particularly if combined with uncertainties relating to the pace of economic activity, could also raise 
concerns about the government’s ability to service its debts. This would raise credit risk-premia and 
government bond yield.  
5. Empirical results 
The system of equations (4) – (8) is estimated as a simultaneous equation model using the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression method (SUR) with annual data for the period 1980 – 2011.3 The 
results are in Table 1. The residual diagnostic tests for absence of serial correlation (Portmanteau) 
of the residuals do not reject the null hypotheses; the normality test (Jarque-Bera), fails only for the 
inflation equation. As we can see from Table 1, the non-normality is caused by outliers who 
produce an excessive kurtosis. Favero and Marcellino (2005) posit that the use of dummies could 
improve the diagnostic tests of the model, but it could weaken its forecasting performance. Since 
forecast is our main goal, we prefer not to introduce such dummies. 
In order to test the prediction properties of the model we estimated the model from 1980 to 2004 
and then forecasted for the next five years, comparing the out-of-sample forecasted values with the 
historically recorded ones
4
. Considering that the aim of the paper is not a punctual forecasting but 
                                                             
2 Output growth is preferred to unemployment or output gap as indicator for the overall level of activity; see Hasko 
(2007). 
3
 The choice of this range of time is based on the fact that data on long-time interest rates are available only from 1980. 
In addition, it is our interest to analyze the fiscal aspects of Spain form the advent of democracy. 
4
 Since that sample period is not very long, an out-of-sample forecast exercise for ten years basing upon only 20 
observations has not a solid basic statistic. For this reason we prefer to use the additional five observations for having a 
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predicting the dynamics, the results are satisfactory: our model predicts a decrease of debt-to-GDP-
ratio until 2007 and then an increase, as effectively happened. We report in appendix the plot of the 
historical debt-to-GDP-ratio versus the debt-to-GDP-ratio forecasted (Figure A2).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
more solid estimation to produce an out-of-sample forecast for five years. We are confident that if the forecast is good 
the projections for additional five years will not biased. 
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Table 1: SUR Estimates of Spain Debt Dynamics (1980 – 2010) 
1 2 1 3 4 1 5 6 1 7 8 1
L L FR US y
t t t t t t t t tg g i i pb pb g g  (Output 
equation) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
2R  
JB 
p-value 
0.0086 
(0.003) 
[3.190] 
0.2052 
(0.077) 
[2.656] 
0.0014 
(0.001) 
[1.746] 
-0.0015 
(0.001) 
[1.962] 
0.4208 
(0.057) 
[7.429] 
-0.3002 
(0.071) 
[4.230] 
0.6214 
(0.095) 
[6.565] 
0.1553 
(0.054) 
[2.896] 
0.911 0.932 
9 10 1 11 2 12 1 1 13 1 14
L pribal
t t t t t t t tpb pb pb i i b g  (Fiscal rule) 
9  10  11  12  13  14  
 2R  
JB 
p-value 
-3.6934 
(0.853) 
[4.332] 
0.7491 
(0.144) 
[5.198] 
-0.1980 
(0.162) 
[1.216] 
0.1491 
(0.149) 
[1.001] 
0.0300 
(0.018) 
[1.625] 
0.6778 
(0.148) 
[4.579] 
 0.852 0.254 
15 16 1 17 18 1 19 1 20 2 21 2 1
L b
t t t t t t t t tb b g pb b i  (Public debt 
equation) 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21  
2R  
JB 
p-value 
6.153 
(2.275) 
[2.704] 
0.9479 
(0.043) 
[22.257] 
-1.6383 
(0.173) 
[9.458] 
-0.5341 
(0.142) 
[3.756] 
0.3416 
(0.229) 
[1.489] 
-0.4519 
(0.239) 
[1.890] 
0.0065 
(0.002) 
[3.069] 
0.979 0.637 
22 23 1 24 1 25 26 1t t t t t tg oil oil  (Inflation equation) 
22  23  24  25  26  
2R  
Skewness 
p-value 
Kurtosis 
p-value 
JB 
p-value 
-0.0038 
(0.005) 
[0.769] 
0.8904 
(0.050) 
[17.650] 
0.0016 
(0.001) 
[1.510] 
0.0163 
(0.007) 
[2.263] 
0.0029 
(0.007) 
[0.385] 
0.904 0.479 0.000 0.000 
27 28 1 29 2 30 31 32
L L L i
t t t t t t ti i i i b  (Long-term interest rate equation) 
27  28  29  30  31  32  
 2R  
JB 
p-value 
-0.3955 
(0.984) 
[0.402] 
0.4984 
(0.116) 
[4.280] 
-0.1894 
(0.100) 
[1.890] 
0.4842 
(0.064) 
[7.508] 
0.1894 
(0.087) 
[2.171] 
0.0300 
(0.018) 
[1.664] 
 0.974 0.201 
System residual Portmanteau tests for autocorrelations 
Q-Stat (Lag 1) 
(Prob. value) 
Q-Stat (Lag 2) 
(Prob. value) 
Q-Stat (Lag 4) 
(Prob. value) 
Q-Stat (Lag 6) 
(Prob. value) 
 
0.089 0.122 0.595 0.433  
Notes: Standard errors and t-ratios are in the parentheses and square brackets respectively 
 
6. Scenarios and debt-to-GDP dynamic forecasts 
Table 2 summarizes the assumptions of three scenarios considered for the exogenous variables (a 
base, a downward/risky scenario, and a policy intervention scenario) together with the results for 
the endogenous variables. In the baseline scenario we assume that US and France GDP growth will 
increase at an average rate of 1.8 and 1.3 percent, respectively, and oil prices grow well above 
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US$200 per barrel.
5
 The first two columns assume no policy intervention while in the last column 
the outcome of a realistic policy intervention, in accordance with favorable international and 
monetary policy conditions is shown. 
 
Table 2: Scenarios and Macroeconomic Analysis for 2011 - 2020 
 Downside scenario Baseline 
scenario 
Policy intervention 
Scenario
†
 
Nominal short-term interest 
rate 
3.5% 4% 3.5% 
2020 Oil price in US dollar 
and Euro  
Nominal 
206$ (155€) 
Nominal 
247$ (186€) 
Nominal 
247$ (186€) 
Real 
184$ (139€) 
Real 
202$ (152€) 
Real 
202$ (152€) 
Real US GDP growth 1.8% 1.6% 1.8% 
Real FRA GDP growth  1.3% 1.1% 1.3% 
2020 Public Debt (% of GDP) 71% 68% 54% 
Primary balance (% of GDP)
 *
  0.02% 0.20% 1.15% 
Nominal long-term interest 
rate
*
  
5.18% 5.50% 4.90% 
Inflation
*
  1.95% 2.22% 2.47% 
Real GDP growth
*
  2.65% 2.43% 3.17% 
General Government balance 
in % of GDP
*
  
3.28% 
(3.27%) 
3.19% 
(3.25%) 
1.54%  
(1.68%) 
* * * * * 0pb i g d  -0.51 -0.19 1.55 
Note: Real values for Oil price change are calculated assuming an international average inflation 
of 2.2% for period 2011 – 2020. * Average values over the period. In parentheses the last value of 
government balance in 2020. 
†
In the policy intervention scenario we assume that Spain 
government increases the GDP growth of 0.3% through growth policies and government surplus 
of 0.3% for all the forecast period 2011 – 2020. 
 
 
 
We simulate accommodating monetary policy (3.5%, below the 4% assumed in the baseline 
scenario) in the baseline international scenario (1.3% of French and 1.8% of US GDP growth until 
2020). In this situation, we assume the Spanish government to raise its surplus by 0.3% and increase 
                                                             
5
 Charles Maxwell of Weeden and Co., a renowned expert in the energy markets, predicts an oil price at US$300 in 
2020. This value could be too high, but if the world economy will recover from the recession and economies such as 
India and China will continue to experience near double-digit growth, then a value well above US$200 is feasible.  
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the baseline GDP growth by 0.3% every year from 2011 to 2020. With these policy mixes the GDP 
growth is, more or less, in line with the average growth of last ten years excluding the last two years 
of recession,
6
 inflation will increase slightly because of increased growth and, most importantly, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio will decrease below the 55% mark in 2020. These two measures permit Spain to 
take a sustainable downward pattern for debt-to-GDP-ratio and the stability condition is satisfied as 
shown in the last row of Table 2. 
Figure 1: Forecasts of macroeconomic variables for period 2011 – 2020. 
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6 The average growth rate for period 1998-2008 is 3.5. 
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Notes: BASE = Baseline scenario, DOWN = Downside scenario, INT = Policy intervention scenario. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we used a small-scale econometric model for Spain in order to study possible patterns 
of debt-to-GDP-ratio in the next ten years. Our results show that, even in the presence of positive 
external scenarios, the debt-to-GDP ratio unlikely to take a sustainable pattern. Our simulation 
showed that a policy intervention aimed at both pushing up the GDP growth rate above the pre-
crisis levels  (above 3%) and implementing the Maastricht restrictions (government deficit below 
3%) are needed to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to a sustainable pattern.   
Data Appendix 
 
  Definitions and Data Source: 1970 - 2010 
Variable Definition Source 
b  Debt-to GDP ratio AMECO - EUROSTAT 
(A-E) 
 Percentage change of Consumer Price Index OECD Statistics 
(OCED-S) 
g  Real GDP growth A-E 
FRg  Real France GDP growth A-E 
pb  Primary balance (Total government revenues 
minus government spending excluding interest 
payments). 
A-E 
i  Nominal short-term interest rate OCED-S 
L
i  
Nominal long-term interest rate OECD-S 
oil  Oil price (WTI - expressed in Euro) percentage 
change  
Federal Reserve 
Economic DATA 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A1: Official deficit-to-GDP-ratio versus our calculated deficit-to-GDP-ratio 
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Figure A2: Historical debt-to-GDP-ratio versus forecasted debt-to_GDP-ratio 
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